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October 1989 ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the effects of  both credit risk and interest-rate risk 
on bank portfolio choices.  It presents a model of banking that explains 
portfolio risks with informational asymmetries; depositors cannot observe the 
returns on bank loans and banks cannot observe depositors  ' liquidity needs.  - 
Bank capital must cover possible losses due to loan default and high future 
deposit costs given the maturity imbalance of bank portfolios.  We show how 
bank capital inadequacy may prevent a bank from investing in the optimal 
portfolio and how the efficiency of the bank's  intermediation technology 
affects its choice of second-best portfolio. I.  INTRODUCTION 
Depository institutions  are unique in the degree of asset 
transformation associated with their intermediaQion  activities. These 
institutions  (hereafter  referred to as banks)  invest in a portfolio of  claims, 
many of which cannot be traded individually in direct credit markets, and are 
often issued by borrowers who would find it prohibitively costly to obtain 
external finance. Banks fund these investments largely by issuing highly 
-2 
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liquid claims that serve as substitutes for legal tender in depositors' 
portfolios. These activities allow banks to profit while creating a primary 
market for certain borrowers and liquidity for bank depositors. The purpose of 
this paper is to examine how the risks associated with asset transformation 
affect bank portfolio choices. 
Recent literature formalizing the allocative role of banks has 
considered the implications of their maturity transformation,  diversification, 
and information production.  Diamond and Dybvig (1983),  Bhattacharya and Gale 
(1987), and Bernanke and Gertler  (1987)  motivate the maturity transformation 
services associated with demand-deposit  contracts by assuming that depositors 
face unobservable stochastic consumption preferences.  Banks must manage the 
liquidity risk of their deposit liabilities. 
Another branch of the financial intermediation  literature focuses on 
the monitoring and diversification services that banks provide on the asset 
side of their balance sheets  (Diamond  [1984],  Williamson [1986], Boyd and 
Prescott [1985],  and Bernanke and Gertler [1987]).  In these papers,  banks 
minimize the real resources used to monitor risky investments in a world where 
information about investment returns is costly  .  l  Also,  by diversifying across many borrowers,  banks can promise a more certain return to 
 depositor^.^  Many of  the results in this area hinge on the ability of 
intermediaries to diversify perfectly. Bernanke and Gertler relax this 
assumption by restricting the ability of banks to diversify away default risk. 
The resulting variability of privately observed bank portfolio returns implies 
that the quantity of bank capital will affect bank performance. 
Previous researchers have usually examined risk on  only one side of 
the balance sheet, treating asset and liability management as separate 
 decision^.^  However,  risks on each side of the balance sheet are jointly 
considered in portfolio management. 
This essay describes a model of a banking sector in which 
intermediation exposes banks to portfolio risks on both sides of their balance 
sheets.  We consider banks that are "special" because they initiate risky 
investments that would not be funded in direct credit markets due to 
information costs (Fama [1985]).  These banks transform both the maturity and 
the default risk of the indirect securities they issue relative to the assets 
in their portfolios. We then examine the effects of credit risk and short-term 
in5erest-rate  variability on bank portfolio management 
portfolio risks arise because of informational asymmetries;  depositors 
cannot observe the returns on bank loans and banks cannot observe depositors' 
liquidity needs. The deposit contract depends on banks' information about 
depositors as well as depositors' information about banks. As a result, 
deposit liabilities have a shor2er maturity than bank assets and .pay  a return 
that is not contingent on  unobservable bank portfolio risks. The structure of  deposit contracts introduces interest-rate risk into 
bank portfolios. This risk translates into uncertainty about deposit costs. 
t 
Interest-rate  swings can  create fluctuations in the relative values of bank 
assets and liabilities and in bank earnings;  consequently, they impact the 
capital accounts of banks. We abstract from the moral hazard problem of 
monitoring the risk of bank investments to focus on the implications of 
interest-rate risk for investment activity.  %  1 
When banks cannot diversify away privately observed risks perfectly, 
bank capital must cover possible portfolio losses due to either loan default 
or high deposit costs. The greater the degree of possible interest-rate 
volatility,  the more banks must rely on their capital accounts to buffer 
corresponding fluctuations in earnings. 
When a banker's capital is insufficient to absorb possible losses on 
the profit-maximizing level of bank projects, the bank is "capital-constrained." 
This constraint requires that a second-best portfolio be chosen to ensure bank 
solvency.  An alternative "reserve" asset will be substituted for risky bank 
projects in  order to eliminate some of the portfolio risk. However,  as the 
expected return on an alternative asset is less than that of the risky 
project,  expected profits are lower for constrained banks. We formalize how 
interest-rate  risk increases the likelihood that a bank will become 
capital-constrained. 
We then consider how bank monitoring costs and the relative portfolio 
risks affect the optimal choice of a reserve asset. A bank can use its 
technology to fund long-term  bank projects with less credit risk or to 
fund short-term storage projects costlessly. The return on the former is higher for banks with an efficient monitoring technology. However,  as 
long-term  (albeit  safer) bank projects do not eliminate interest-rate  risk 
from the bank portfolio, their effectiveness per project in  reducing portfolio 
risk is smaller.  A capital-constrained  bank faces a retum  and risk-reduction 
trade-off in  choosing among alternative reserve assets.  This further 
illuminates the dual role of banks in transforming both the credit risk and 
maturity of their specialized loan portfolio. 
An important conclusion of this analysis is that the efficiency of a 
bank's  specialized intermediation technology will affect its choice of 
second-best portfolio. For relatively efficient but capital-constrained  banks, 
the retum  from using their technology may be sufficient to cover losses from 
maturity imbalances. We describe when long-term bank projects are the 
preferred reserve assets because of the real return to utilizing bank 
technology. We also show how the degree of relative risk on either side of the 
bank's balance sheet affects the choice of the optimal reserve asset. 
Section I1 outlines the model of the banking sector. Sections 111  and 
IV describe the alternative equilibria for banks with differing degrees of 
'# 
ef£iciency in  funding investments. Section V is the conclusion. 
11. THE BASIC MODEL OF DEPOSITORS AND BANKS 
This section presents the framework used to examine the effects of both 
default risk and short-term interest-rate risk on the banking equilibrium. 
i 
Production Possibilities 
Three production technologies are available in the economy.  Each technology requires an initial investment of the economy's endowment in a 
project that yields consumption goods in a future period. The investment 
opportunities of the economy are described by thh following three projects: 
1)  Default-free long-term projects,  I*,  yield a certain gross rate of 
return, R*,  two periods after the projects are undertaken. 
2) Risky long-term projects,  1,  have an expected gross rate of return,  R,  in 
the second period after the projects are undertaken.  The returns on these 
,I  .. 
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projects are random and can be observed only by the originator of the 
investments.  The gross rate of return on this technology has a lower bound of 
R~.  The distribution of returns on risky projects is costlessly obsenred by 
all individuals in the economy. 
3)  Default-risk free,  short-term storage projects,  s,  yield a certain gross 
rate of return, r,  one period later.  The gross yield from this technology can 
be consumed or reinvested at a  future short-term rate. However, the future 
short-term storage rate,  effective upon reinvestment,  is random when the 
projects are undertaken. In the initial investment period, the one-period 
future storage rate has an expected gross rate of return, rl,  and an  upper 
bound,  rh,  which is observed by all individuals in the economy. 
Both long-term investments are funded through banks that possess the 
technology to locate these projects and to monitor them, when necessary. 
Monitoring and locating requires a fraction of the total resources invested in 
the project, &(€I).  This monitoring cost differs across bankers; 6(ei) 
is  the marginal monitoring cost of a type ei  banker.  The distribution of 
bankers will be ordered by the efficiency of their technology, where 
(2.1)  6(ei)<6(ej), as Bi < Bj and where Bi is the fraction of all individuals with 
monitoring costs of 6(0,)  or less. The following relationships are assumed 
to hold: 
Rm  <  R*  <  < rrh.  (2.  2,  (1+6 (0)  )  (1+6  (0)  )  (1+6 (0)  ) 
All individuals in the economy can invest in short-term storage 
projects. 
Depositors and Bankers 
The economy consists of a continuum of individuals measured along the 
interval (0,l). These individuals live for three periods, indexed by (0,1,2). 
In period 0  they receive an endowment w,  which they invest to maximize 
expected utility.  An exogenous fraction,  a,  will be called depositors.  The 
remaining fraction,  (1-a),  will be called bankers. 
As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), depositors face privately 
observed liquidity risks modeled as preference shocks. A fraction, t,  will 
desire to consume their wealth in period one.  The remaining fraction  will 
desire to consume it in the following period.  A depositor's ex-post 
pqpferences are not observable.  Depositors do not know their preference type 
in period zero;  thus, they desire to hold a portfolio that can be liquidated 
completely in either period. 
One investment option for depositors is short-term storage. 
Alternatively,  banks issue deposits to fund bank-specific projects. Banks 
offer a deposit contract, described below,  which can be liquidated or 
reinvested in period one. Formally, a representative depositor maximizes his expected utility 
given his endowment, aw: 
(2.3)  Max  E(U(cl,c2))  = t ln(~c~,)  +  (1-t) 1n?(l3cd2) 
(d,sd)  s.t. 
(2.4)  E(c~,)  = rdd + rsd, 
(2.5)  ~(c~,)  = rd
2d + rrlsd, 
(2.6)  aw = d + sd, 
%, 
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where d are deposits,  sd  is direct investment in storage assets,  and cdl 
and cd2  are first-period and second-period consumption,  respectively. The 
expected one-period and two-period deposit rates are rd and rd
2. The 
first-order  necessary conditions for d and sd imply that depositors will 
hold bank liabilities only if they yield at least the expected return on the 
storage technology. 
Bankers' fraction of the population is  (1-a).  They live for three 
periods and maximize their expected consumption in period two.  Bankers 
possess the technology for locating and monitoring long-term investment 
projects.  In period zero,  a given banker decides whether or not to operate a 
bank.  If he operates a bank,  he invests his  :endowment as bank capital and 
I 
issues deposit liabilities to fund bank-specific  projects. The efficiency of 
his intermediation  technology determines  whether he can operate profitably; 
the expected return on  bank-specific  projects must be greater than that of the 
storage technology.  In  choosing among bank-specific projects,  a banker 
maximizes investment in projects with the highest expected return. From  (2.1) 
and (2.2),  a banker of type ej will operate a bank if where rrl  = R/ (1+6(6)  )  defines 6  as the type of the marginal 
operating bank and the fraction of individuals who operate as bankers. A 
banker with a more efficient technology has ahigher  expected net return from 
locating and monitoring long-term projects. 
To ensure that some fraction  of bankers will operate (6 > 0),  it 
is assumed that the gross expected rate of return on the storage technology is 
below that of the long-term risky project. To ensure an interior solution for 
the number of operating banks in the economy, it is assumed that the least- 
efficient banker does not find it profitable to operate: 
where 6(1-a)  is the monitoring cost of the least-efficient  banker  (type 
Bj=(l-a))  in the population. 
Nonoperating bankers lend to operating banks. Because they are 
risk-neutral and maximize expected period-two consumption, they will be 
willing to hold two-period "time deposits." 
Operating bankers are located in a "market."  The remaining 
bankers and short-term depositors are distributed evenly across markets, and 
cafinot  costlessly move across markets.  Thus,  a bank knows the quantity of 
depositors it will receive and the minimum rate of return it must pay to 
attract depositors. 
The following quantities will be used in characterizing the economy. 
The total monitoring costs in the economy are 
I where 0 5 6 5  (1-0)  .  Normalizing the number of operating bankers at 
unity, the average quantities of demand deposits,  time deposits,  and bank 
't 
capital are wd=aw, wt  =(l-a-i))w,  and W"  = Gw,  respectively. 
The Portfolio Choice of an Operating Bank 
In this section,  the optimization problem of an operating banker is 
described. The nature of the profit-maximizing  deposit contract must satisfy  ,' 
:?: 
the banker's maximization problem and the utility maximization problem of 
depositors.  (The  indexes identifying the technological type of banker have 
been omitted for notational clarity.) 
In period zero,  an operating bank chooses an investment portfolio funded 
by bank capital and deposit liabilities that satisfies the following portfolio 
balance constraint: 
(2.10)  (1+6)  (1  +  l*) +  s - W"  + d + dt  , 
where d and dt are the quantities of demand deposits and time deposits 
issued by the bank. In period zero, expected period-two bank profits are 
(2.11)  E(x)  = R1  + ~*l*  + rlsl  -  rd2(l-t)d  -  rtdt, 
where sl  is the share of bank assets invested in the storage technology in 
period one, rd2  is the gross expected yield on demand deposits held for 
two periods,  and rt  is the gross time-deposit rate. 
Technological and informational assumptions affect the contracts 
issued by banks to attract deposits. One important friction is that a 
project's return is observed only by the originating bank. A second important 
assumption is that a bank funds a finite number of risky projects and thus 
cannot perfectly diversify idiosyncratic risk on its most profitable investments. Finally,  we assume that depositors 1)  can observe bank balance 
sheets in their locality,  2)  know the distribution of depositors in their 
locality,  3)  know  the distribution of future short-term rates,  and 4) know the 
lower bound on  bank-specific projects. 
A  bank must issue demand-deposit contracts that 1) promise a 
default-free rate of return,  2)  promise an expected yield that is competitive 
with that of the storage technology, and 3)  can  be withdrawn after one or two 
periods. A bank can fulfill these conditions by satisfying 
(2.13)  Rml  + ~*l*  +  rJs,  2 rdZj(l-t)d + rtdtl (j=l,h), 
(2.14)  rd22rr,, 
(2.15)  rd>r. 
Equations  (2.12)  and  (2.13)  state that the return on a bank's  portfolio will 
be able to compensate depositors as promised in any state of nature  (where  the 
subscripts 1 and h  refer to the states where the lower bound and upper bound 
on  the future storage rate are realized,  respectively).  Equations  (2.14)  and 
(2.15)  require that the expected return on deposit contracts be at least equal 
:-' 
to the expected return on the short-term storage technology. 
The Maximization Problem of the Marginal Operating Banker 
The constrained-optimization  problem of the marginal operating banker 
determines the profit-maximiziy  deposit contract. An operating banker desires 
to maximize the share of: his portfolio invested in long-term,  risky projects. 
A demand-deposit  contract,  where storage is held solely to pay off early 
consumers, minimizes a bank's holdings of short-term projects  (and  maximizes expected bank profits) .= This contract promises to pay a deposit rate equal 
I 
! 
to the current short-term rate.  Thus, a bank pqols the liquidity risks of 
depositors  (by  issuing them demand deposits) while investing in long-term 
I  assets. 
The constrained-optimization  problem of the marginal operating banker 
I 
I  also determines when this optimal portfolio is feasible. Other operating 
i  1 
bankers' portfolios will be related to the marginal banker's portfolio via tl-& 
&%A 
I 
distribution of the monitoring technology.  The marginal operating banker will 
I  make zero expected economic profits as his net expected return on long-term 
I  > 
I  risky investmeats equals the two-period expected rate of return on short-term 
I 
1  investments. The marginal banker in the economy solves 
i 
I 
(2.16)  Max  E(X(~)), 
1, 
1  I 
I  (l*,l,~)  8 
1 
I  I  subject to (2.12)-(2.15)  and 
111  (2.17)  rs -  rdtd - s,, 
I.  i  where n(6) is defined by  (2.11).  Substituting the constraint  (2.17)  for 
I 
1'11  s, and using the portfolio balance constraint  (2.10)  to eliminate d from the 
problem, the first-order necessary conditions for 1,  l*,  and s are 
1;:  I 
I I  I!,  I  (2.20)  r  (rl+Blrh+P)  > rdt(rl+plrh+p)  +  (1-  t) (rd2+plrdZh)  , 
I' ! 
//  j 
respectively,  where p  is the multiplier for constraint  (2.12)  and p1 is 
~JJI  the multiplier for the solvency constraint  (2.13).  All banks pay depositors  i  1 
the opportunity cost of their funds. The profit-maximizing deposit costs are 
I:.: 
11.: 
1 rt=rr1  2)  rLr,  and 3)  rdZj=rri,  where the future short-term rate is bounded by  (rl,rh).  The marginal operating bank has a monitoring 
cost of 
and makes zero expected prof  its. ' 
3.11. THE UNCONSTRAINED BANKING ALLOCATIONS 
This section describes the alternative equilibrium portfolios of an 
operating bank and of the aggregate economy. The results presented are for 
banks that can intermediate funds only in their particular location. 
We assume that the marginal operating bank uses its technology; thus, 
(2.9)  and  (2.21)  determine the number of operating banks as a fraction of the 
population, 2  <  (1-a) . 
For all banks with monitoring costs below 6(6), 
>rrl fore<g.  (3-1)  (1+6(e)) 
These banks maximize profits by maximizing their investments in the long-term, 
risky technology and holding storage projects only to meet expected period-one 
wikhdrawals  ; this describes the "optimal portfolio.  " A type 8  bank has the 
following portfolio balance constraint for the optimal portfolio: 
(3.2)  1(8)(1+6(8))  + s -  wb  + wt + wd. 
The left-hand  side of equation  (3.2)  shows that a  'bank's investments vary 
inversely with its monitoring costs,  since each bank has the same resources to 
invest. Actual bank profits willt  vary randomly with 1)  the actual return on 
risky projects and 2)  the actual future interest costs on demand deposits. The bounds of possible default losses and future  &posit  costs are defined by 
(2.2).  The worst possible profit scenario occurs when a bank realizes the 
I 
maximum default losses and the highest deposit costs. 
The Unconstrained Banking Allocation 
The unconstrained allocation for a type B bank is feasible if 
The optimal portfolio for an unconstrained bank is thus 
(3.4)  (1+6(8))1*,  = 0, 
(3.5)  (1+6(8))1,  = wb  + wt  +  (1-t)wd, 
(3.6)  s,=twd, 
I  where the subscript u denotes that a bank is unconstrained. 
If the marginal operating bank's portfolio satisfies (3.3),  all banks 
I 
A 
of types ei  < 8  are also unconstrained.  Summing over all operating 
banks,  expected bank profits for the economy are 
since  s=t&.  We  will compare alternative constrained allocations to the 
unconstrained allocation. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE CAPITAL-CONSTRAINED  BANKING ALLOCATIONS 
1 
i  To invest in the optimal bank portfolio,  a bank's capital 
I 
I  must be sufficient to cover possible losses on  the share of risky bank assets, 
funded by deposit liabilities.  When this condition is not satisfied,  a  bank 
is capital-constrained. This occurs when The first term in  (4.1)  is the maximum possible portfolio losses on  savings 
deposits,  due to both high future short-term rates and asset default. The 
second term is the maximum losses on time deposits due to default losses on 
investments made with these funds. The expression (4.1),  to be called A,  is 
strictly positive when the solvency constraint is binding. We shall describe 
the alternative equilibria that satisfy the bank solvency constraint in terms 
of the optimal portfolio and the term A. 
Since A is increasing in b(8), the distribution of monitoring costs 
will determine the marginal unconstrained bank. Letting 5(eU) solve A = 0, 
then 8"  is the share of operating banks that attain the first-best 
equilibrium. 
A capital-constrained  bank must choose an alternative investment, a 
"reserve" asset to reduce the risk of the bank portfolio. It  has two possible 
asset-management  options: 
1)  invest in more short-term storage projects,  reinvesting the yield in period 
one,  as a substitute for a share of risky investments;  and 
2)  invest in a larger share of default-free,  long-term investments as a 
s-qbstitute  for risky investments. 
"9 
These choices shall be referred to as options 1  and 2,  respectively. 
Because both of these assets have a lower expected return,  capital-constrained 
banks will have lower expected profits than if they could invest in the 
unconstrained portfolio. Thus,  when eU < 6, the aggregate quantity of 
long-term risky investments and aggregate expected profits will be less than 
the unconstrained  levels. A  second-best  portfolio minimizes the decrease in expected profits 
relative to the optimal portfolio while meeting the capital constraint. The 
second-best  portfolio is not identical for all bahks;  the optimal reserve 
asset depends on  the efficiency of a banker's technology.  Bank technology 
determines the relative rate of return on using option 1  versus option 2 to 
meet the capital constraint;  more efficient banks find that option 2  has a 
higher  (per-unit)  rate of return. However, option 2  reduces only default risk 
,..# 
in a  bank's  portfolio; it provides a smaller per-unit degree of risk  ,  P' 
reduction. The degree of default risk relative to interest-rate  risk in  asset 
markets determines how much of the respective reserve assets must be  held to 
meet the capital constraint. 
A  bank will unambiguously use the storage asset as a reserve asset 
when that return dominates the return on default-free bank projects. This will 
be the case for operating banks of types 8, > 8*,  where 6(8*) solves 
If 8*  > eU,  capital-constrained banks of types ei < 8*  may find it 
optimal to use long-term projects as a reserve asset. For a bank with 
sufficiently low monitoring costs,  the higher rate of return on long-term 
projects outweighs the opportunity cost of investing a  larger share of the 
portfolio in the reserve asset. 
The alternative allocations are derived in the appendix. In the 
following sections,  options 1 and 2 will be described and compared to the 
first-best allocation. Alternative Constrained Allocations 
Option 1  can be expressed in terms of A as 
(4.4)  lcl  - l"  -  A  where cl  =  (rrh-L).  c,  (1+6) '  (  l+6 1 
Option 2  can be expressed in terms of A as 
(4.5)  I*,,  =  A  A  -- 
(R*-  Rm)  C2' 
A  (4.6)  1 .  = lU - -  where c2  = (R* .  -  Rm)  .  c2  C2 ' 
Note that as cl  (described  as the risk reduction per unit of storage) is 
greater than c2,  lCl  is greater than lC2. 
/' 
Comparing Alternative Portfolio Strategies 
In the unconstrained equilibrium,  expected profits are 
(4.7)  E(mu)  =~l~-rr,((l-t)wd+w~). 
Expected profits in the two alternative constrained equilibria are 
A  (4.9)  E(r,,)  = R(lU- -)  + R*(~)  -  rrl((l-t)wd  + wt). 
Expected profits are higher for banks when investing in default-free, 
long-term projects to reduce portfolio risk when 
The expected profitability of option 2 is inversely related to monitoring 
costs  (and  to A).  Letting 6(eC2) solve  (4.10) with equality,  we find 
that the marginal monitoring cost below which option 2  represents the 
second-best equilibrium is 
The value of  6  (gc2)  represents a  corner solution for banks. Also, the number of banks choosing option 2  is positively related to 
the degree of default risk relative to interest-rate risk. Determining the 
parameter values such that no bank will find opti8n c2  to be more profitable 
than option cl involves solving  (4.11)  for 6(eC2) = 0.  Rearranging the 
resulting expression illustrates that 6(OC2) is positive and 
increasing in the following expression: 
This expression  has a useful interpretation.  The terms in the numerators of 
the ratios reflect the expected opportunity cost  (per  unit) of options 1 and 
2,  respectively, independent of bank monitoring costs. The terms in the 
denominators measure the degree of portfolio risk-reduction  (per  unit) of 
options 1  and 2,  respectively.  Thus, the ratio measures the marginal cost 
relative to the marginal benefit of the alternatives for all banks. As the 
cost/benefit ratio of  option 1 rises relative to that of option 2, 
6(eC2)  increases,  and banks with less-efficient technologies find it 
profitable to shift to using bank projects as a reserve asset. 
When default losses have a large weight in the risk of bank portfolios, 
default-free bank projects are a more efficient substitute for risky assets 
than the storage technology.  A mean-preserving spread on  R unambiguously 
increases the marginal monitoring cost below which option 2 is optimal. It 
should be noted that the share of banks that are constrained increases as 
well. Thus,  the total holdings of these reserve assets increase. 
When interest-rate  variability plays a larger role in constraining bank 
portfolio choices,  the storage technology is a more efficient reserve asset. 
A mean-preserving spread of the distribution of future short-term rates increases the fraction of banks that use option 1 (eC2  falls);  this,  in 
turn, increases the share of banks that are constrained as well as the 
aggregate quantity of storage projects  .  lo 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has focused on analyzing the implications of  bank asset 
transformation  for bank portfolio choice. Our model shows how a short-term 
'M 
substitute for bank liabilities and informational asymmetries  force banks to 
consider interest-rate  variability as well as default risk. 
A  frequent result in the asymmetric information literature is that 
information costs create a nonlinearity in the optimization problem of 
risk-neutral agents,  which makes them behave as if they are risk-averse. The 
'ajspersion of imperfectly observed variables affects the expected information 
costs associated with making a transaction. 
In our framework, there are sufficiently high costs for 1) 
risk-neutral  depositors to observe bank project returns and 2)  risk-neutral 
banks to observe depositors' preference shocks. Hence,  banks "self-insure" 
that they can pay off deposit liabilities under all possible portfolio 
outcomes. When a bank is capital-constrained,  meeting the worst possible 
outcome involves choosing a second-best portfolio,  and a risk-neutral banker 
is forced to sacrifice  (expected)  return for portfolio risk-reduction. 
Although both depositors and bankers are risk-neutral,  asymmetric information 
forces a constrained bank to consider risk factors as well as  (expected) 
return. Given that a bank is capital-constrained,  the relative portfolio risks 
affect a bank's  choice of a reserve asset to reduce portfolio risk. The 
expected relative return from using bank technology and the relative portfolio 
risks affect the choice of the most efficient reshe  asset. A bank will weigh 
the expected return/risk-reduction  trade-off of alternative bank investment 
opportunities. In a sense,  a bank has an efficient frontier of projects, and 
the parameters of the binding capital-constraint  determine its portfolio 
choices. 
Capital-constrained  banks behave as if they are risk-averse to avoid  , 
'  ;, 
the extreme costs of indifference toward risk,  which is the inability to 
conduct intermediation and profit from their technology. FOOTNOTES 
1.  See Gertler  (1988)  for an expose on this literature. 
2.  These models do not model deposit insurance in their analyses. 
3.  Bemanke and Gertler  (1987)  do have both risky assets and demand deposits, 
but the latter are relatively inconsequential to their analysis. 
. 
4.  This market structure results in a banker accruing all of the profits when 
the  (expected)  marginal return  on  his portfolios is above the opportunity cost 
of funds. 
5.  This is the case because a mutual-fund-type  "share" contract requires 
banks to hold a reserve of storage assets to meet higher period-one deposit 
costs when future storage rates are low. 
6.  Because the expected return on risky projects is greater than the expected 
two-period storage rate for all but the marginal operating banker,  bankers 
minimize their storage holdings and satisfy  (3.12)  and  (3.15)  by linking 
one-period deposit  returns to market rates. 
7.  The multiplier  #3  = 0,  even when constraint  (3.9)  is holding with 
equality. 
8.  This separation of banking markets is necessary because bankers have 
different monitoring costs,  which are assumed to exhibit constant returns to 
scale. Another way to avoid having a monopolistic banker would be to place an 
upper bound on the quantity of projects a banker can evaluate. 
9.  6  (ec2) is decreasing in r,  r,,  rh,  and R,  and .increasing  in 
R* and R~. 
10.  The effect on the quantity of long-term,  default-free investments is 
uncertain. APPENDIX: ALTERNATIVE CAPITAL-CONSTRAINED  ALLOCATIONS 
Option 1 can be described by 
(A.l)  l*cl=O,  I 
(A.2)  (1+6)lC1 + s,,  -  twd =  (1+6)lU, 
(A.3)  (scl  - 4)  > 0, 
where scl  solves 
Using (A.l),  (A.2),  (A.3),  and the appropriate substitutions,  'scl  and 
lCl  can be expressed in terms of A  (in  section IV) as: 
(4.4)  lc1=lu-  A  where cl  = rrh  - -  R"  cl  (I+&) '  (1+6) ' 
Option 2 involves substituting default-free long-term projects for risky, 
long-term investments to satisfy the solvency constraint; thus, 
(A. 5)  (1+6)ltC2 = wb +  (1-t)wd + wt -  1,,(1+S), 
(A. 6)  1,- < lU, 
(A.7)  s,,=s"=t~~. 
The value for  will solve 
Rm  (wb  +  (1-  t)wd  + wt-  l*cz  (I+&))  + ~*1*~~  = rrh(l-t)wd +  rrlwt.  (A.8)  - 
(  1+6 
From  (A.5)  to  (A.8),  expressions for 1*c2  and lC2  in terms of A are 
A  where cz =  (R*  -  R") .  (4.6)  1,.  = F  - , 
Because cl  (which  is the risk-reduction per unit of storage) is greater than 
Cz  lcl '  lC2' REFERENCES 
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